Abstract. We study here the effect of firm-level corporate governance on market value in emerging markets. Existing studies are either "deep and narrow" single-country studies, studying governance in depth within a single country, or "shallow and broad," massively multicountry studies, covering many firms across many countries, but with limited governance measures, few firm-level control variables, and pure-cross-sectional data. Single-country results may not generalize, yet multicountry studies have multiple weaknesses and provide a weak basis for causal inference. This paper discusses the severe data and construct validity issues in multicountry studies. We introduce here a "middle ground." We study in depth five major emerging markets (Brazil, Russia, India, Korea, and Turkey); develop time-series governance data in each, and address construct validity by building country-specific indices. We then assess whether an overall governance index predicts firm market value, both in each country and pooled across countries. We discuss how firm fixed effects results differ from cross-sectional OLS, pooled OLS, and firm random effects, and the sensitivity of our results to choice of control variables and how we handle outliers. Our country-specific indices have power to predict Tobin's q; in contrast, the best "common index" we can build has little or none.
A second, less studied but more fundamental issue is lack of data on governance. One often sees efforts to use a common set of elements to build a multicountry index and then pool all countries together in a single regression.
2 As we will show, it is impossible to use public data to build a broad governance index based on common elements, even across the five countries we study. It is nearly impossible to do so even relying on private surveys of firms (as we do in Brazil, India, and Korea). And if we try, the best common index we can build predicts nothing. Data on control variables is also often hard to come by.
A third, also more fundamental issue is "construct validity" -a term we borrow from education and psychology (see Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002 , for an overview). In education, a test score is an imperfect measure of underlying skill. Similarly, a governance index is a construct that imperfectly measures underlying governance quality. There is no direct way to quantify the direction and magnitude of the gap between the construct and the underlying concept. Moreover, what matters in governance often depends on local norms and institutions; thus, the same construct may be a better fit for underlying governance in some countries than in others. Consider, for example, an audit committee. These committees might be useful-but we can't measure their value in India and Turkey, where they are required, nor in Russia, where board committees are formally not permitted; and can learn little in Brazil, where many firms employ the substitute Brazilian institution of the "fiscal board."
We seek here to make progress on all three dimensions: better methods; better data; and close attention to construct validity. We conduct longitudinal research projects in five major emerging markets --Brazil, Russia, India, Korea, and Turkey (together, "BRIKT countries"). Together, these countries provide a representative sample of the results one might expect in moderately developed emerging markets. They differ in many ways, including legal traditions, language, culture, geographic location, and background legal rules.
We address construct validity by building country-specific indices which reflect local norms and institutions. Each is comprised (data permitting) of subindices for board structure, board procedure, disclosure, ownership structure, minority shareholder rights, and control of related party transactions.
Each subindex is comprised of one or more "elements" that capture specific aspects of governance that we believe to be important in each country. The indices and subindices for each country are broadly similar, but reflect the rules and data limitations in each country.
We then assess whether governance affects firm market value (proxied by Tobin's q) in each country, what generalizes across countries, and how firm fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) results differ from cross-sectional or pooled OLS results. We also conduct extensive sensitivity tests and discuss the extent to which our results depend on choice of control variables and the functional form of the dependent variable.
We seek here to find a "middle way" between single-country studies, from which it is hard to generalize; and "massively multicountry" studies, which to date have been purely cross-sectional and also face severe data and construct validity issues. We develop methods appropriate for combining individual country studies. Those methods developed here for cautiously generalizing across a number of countries (but not too many) will provide a way forward.
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our country-level governance indices.
Section 3 develops our methodology. Section 4 presents results for individual countries. Section 5 presents pooled cross-country results. Section 6 concludes. We skip the usual literature review, and refer readers to the recent review by one of us (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013) , and the briefer review in Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2012) . We focus here on results for an overall governance index, largely for space reasons. In a companion article, we apply the data and methods developed here to study the extent to which particular subindices or governance elements predict firm market value, for which firms, in which countries (Black et al., 2013) . We find that disclosure is consistently valuable across countries, board structure appears to matter in some countries, but little else about governance has a consistent effect.
Samples, Governance Surveys, and Indices
To build governance indices, we rely on private surveys in Brazil (2004 Brazil ( , 2006 Brazil ( , 2009 India (2006 India ( , 2007 India ( , 2012 , Korea (1998 Korea ( -2004 , public data (but extensive hand collection) in Turkey (2006 Turkey ( -2011 , and a mix of public and private data in Russia (1999 Russia ( -2005 . 4 We exclude state-controlled firms, subsidiaries of foreign companies, and banks. 3 This research complements our studies of individual countries. At the risk of an annoying amount of self-citation: In Brazil, see Gorga (2010, 2012) ; Black, de Carvalho and Sampaio (2012) , de Carvalho and Pennacchi (2012) . In India, see Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna (2010) Black and Khanna (2007) ; Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) . In Korea, see Black, Jang and Kim (2006a) ; Black and Kim (2012) ; Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2013) . In Russia, see Black (2001) , Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006) . In Turkey, see Ararat, Orbay, and Yurtoglu (2010) ; Ararat, Black and Yurtoglu (2013) . 4 The Brazil, India, and Korea surveys are available on request. Russia is different from the other four countries in a number of ways. We rely on six different privately created governance indices, available for different firms at different times, rather than building our own index. Russia also has weaker data for control variables. Statements in this paper about regularities across countries include Russia only to the extent that the underlying data is available. Our challenges with Russia underscore the general theme of this paper about the challenges in obtaining data on governance across countries.
Brazil as Illustrative Example: Governance Survey
To illustrate our approach, we summarize here our Brazil sample, data collection, and governance
index. An expanded working paper version of this article provides similar information for other countries (Black et al., 2013b and IBGC (a Brazilian corporate governance organization). We followed up repeatedly with each firm to encourage them to respond. We also followed up with individual firms that responded to the survey to obtain responses to survey questions that were initially left blank or for which the responses were unclear. Table 1 summarizes the replies. We obtain sufficient information from at least one survey to both build the governance index and compute Tobin's q and most control variables for 142 of 254 sample-eligible firms (56%), representing 72% of the market cap of eligible firms. Response rates are somewhat lower for individual years. Sample selection bias is thus a concern, for which we have no ready solution. Firm fixed effects will reduce this concern, but only 68 firms answered two or more surveys. This limits the effective fixed effects sample size. 5 We supplement the surveys with information from the CVM website, firm charters, and firm annual reports. Table 2 lists the subindices and their elements for Brazil, and also India, Korea, and Turkey. Table 2 also indicates which elements are non-public (available from our surveys). For each element used in one country, it indicates whether the element is "available" in the other countries (we have data,
Brazil Corporate Governance Index and Subindices
or could obtain it without great difficulty) or "feasible" (we could compute it with substantial additional 5 India and Russia pose similar concerns with sample selection bias and a highly unbalanced panel. We come much closer to complete coverage of public firms in Korea and Turkey. See expanded working paper for details. 6 We also obtain data on firms' market capitalization and listing level from Bovespa, at www.bovespa.com.br/principal.asp; financial data from the Economatica database, at www.economatica.com; basic company information from annual reports, available from InfoInvest at www.infoinvest.com.br; and information on cross-listing from databases maintained by Bank of New York, at www.adrbny.com, Citibank, at wwss.citissb.com/adr/www/brokers/index.htm, CVM, at www.cvm.gov.br, Deutsche Bank, at www.adr.db.com, and JP Morgan, at www.adr.com. effort, usually to hand-collect data from company annual reports). We treat an element as "useful" if: (i) it is often believed to correspond to good governance (sometimes with empirical support, but more often not); (ii) we have reasonably complete data on it; (iii) there is reasonable variation across firms; and (iv) the element is sufficiently different from another element to justify inclusion.
We describe here our Brazil Corporate Governance Index (BCGI) and some of its unique features. BCGI is composed of six subindices, which in turn reflect 41 "useful" firm attributes. The index does not include elements required by Brazilian law, for which there will little variation across firms. Most elements are dichotomous (coded as "1" if a firm has the attribute and "0" otherwise). We normalize continuous variables to run from 0~1.
Brazil Board Structure Subindex (7 elements). Board independence is seen as a core element of corporate governance (e.g., OECD, 2004; Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008 ). An audit committee, staffed principally or entirely by independent directors, can help to ensure the integrity of financial reporting (e.g., Klein, 2002) . In Brazil, the fiscal board plays a role in oversight of financial reporting similar to an audit committee, and often substitutes for the audit committee, so our governance index considers this institution as well.
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Brazil Board Procedure Subindex (6 elements). Assessments of board procedures are a common component of broad governance indices. Their effect on firm value remains an open question. A firm's internal procedures are a third common aspect of corporate governance. Our index assesses whether a board meets at least four times per year, whether it regularly evaluates the CEO and other executives, whether board members receive materials in advance of board meetings, and whether the firm has a bylaw governing the board and a code of ethics.
Brazil Disclosure Subindex (11 elements). Prior research finds that disclosure is associated with higher firm market value (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005) . We identify 11 usable disclosure elements. The elements include, among other things, whether the firm prepares financial statements that meet international accounting standards; prepares English language financial statements; provides financial disclosures, such as a statement of cash flows, that are common in other countries but not required in 7 The fiscal board is elected by shareholders and must include a representative chosen by minority shareholders. The members of the fiscal board report individually at the annual shareholder meeting on whether they approve the company's financial statements. For Brazilian companies that cross-list in the U.S., which are required to have an audit committee under the Sarbanes-Oxley law, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission treats the fiscal board as an acceptable substitute.
Brazil; posts financial statements on a company web site; discloses major shareholders; and discloses related party transactions (RPTs).
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Brazil Ownership Structure Subindex (5 elements). A "wedge" between cash flow rights and voting rights can provide incentives for self-dealing, and predicts lower firm value (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002) . Many Brazilian firms create such a wedge by using dual-class structures, with insiders holding a majority of the voting common shares and outsiders holding primarily non-voting, but otherwise common-equivalent preferred shares. Ownership structure subindex includes the fraction of nonvoting shares; the largest shareholder's fractional ownership of voting shares; the wedge between this person's voting and economic rights; whether the control group is small (and hence more cohesive); and whether there are large outside blockholders who can monitor the controller.
Brazil RPT Subindex (5 elements): Related party transactions are a core governance concern in many emerging markets (e.g., Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002; Atanasov et al., 2010) . We extract from the survey and firm charters four elements relating to the existence of related party transactions and approval procedures for these transactions. If the firm's charter forbids RPTs, the firm receives a maximum score of 5. If RPTs are not forbidden but firm does not engage in them, it receives a score of 4. If firm engages in RPTs, it scores 03 depending on the procedure for approving RPTs (board, non-conflicted directors, or non-conflicted shareholders).
Brazil Shareholder Rights Subindex (7 elements): We extract from the survey seven elements related to minority shareholder rights: takeout rights on a sale of control; freezeout rights (above the legal minimum); shareholder rights for election of directors; arbitration of disputes with shareholders; preemptive rights; and 25% minimum free float. less year-to-year variation than in other countries, which limits the power of firm fixed effects regressions.
In India, Korea, and Turkey, we construct subindices and an overall country index in the same manner as for Brazil, as the renormalized sum of normalized subindices.
Russia. In Russia, we rely not on a single index that we build, but instead on six separate indices, created by others, covering somewhat different firms at different times over 1999-2005. Because we do not control how the indices are built, and for some do not have element by element data, we cannot build a set of subindices. We instead normalize each index and use the normalized indices to build an overall Russia Corporate Governance Index (RCGI). Russia also has more limited control variables. We include it in reporting results below only where feasible. 
Comparison to Developed Markets
Our elements and subindices reflect measures that would likely be important in emerging markets. These differ from elements that would be appropriate in developed markets. Some of this non-overlap reflects the limited scope of the GIM and ISS indices, 13 but most reflects the difference between a US-centric index and one that would be appropriate in an emerging market.
Commonalities and Differences across Countries
While we seek to maintain common subindices and elements where feasible, we adapt our governance index both to the data available in each country and to country-specific institutions. For example, 18 of the 41 Brazil elements are unique to Brazil. In each of the other four countries, the data is not available, or the practice does not exist or lacks meaningful variation. 16 In that complexity lies a central message of this article. We did our best to build broad indices, covering similar aspects of governance, in each country. At the subindex, we hope that we more-or-less succeeded. At the level of individual elements, we did not. The elements that are useful across countries differ radically. One measure of those differences: Table 2 contains 121 elements used in at least one country. Of these, 83
are used in only one country; 38 in two or more countries; 8 in three or more, and none are used in all four countries.
Another measure of the differences: Suppose that we sought to build a "Public Index", using elements that are publicly available in all five countries. That index would have only four elements: one board structure element (audit committee exists) and three disclosure elements (firm discloses 5%
holders; firm has English language financials; financial statements include statement of cash flows).
There would be no elements for the board procedure, ownership, shareholder rights, and RPT subindices.
Indeed, there is even less to the Public Index than the little that meets the eye. Consider India.
Audit committees are required; all financials are in English and include a statement of cash flows. This leaves one useful element -whether the firm discloses 5% holders. Even there, usefulness is limited, since "promoter" ownership is disclosed.
Can educated guessing help? We don't think so. Consider the Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) board independence study. In countries where they lack data on which directors are independent, they infer independence based on where a director is employed by the firm or has the same family name as the controlling family. For Brazil in 2002, they estimate that 57% of directors in their sample firms were independent. We find that the mean percentage of outside directors in 2004 is 23%. Our samples are different, but the difference in percentages is far too large to be explained in this way. 17 In our view, their estimate provides mostly noise, not signal.
Can We Build An Index with Common Elements?
We can improve on the Public Index by using private survey data, at the cost of building an index that cannot be replicated in a massively multicountry study. Suppose we ask: which elements are available during our sample period in Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey, and useful (have meaningful variation) in at least two countries? We use these elements to build a "Common-2 Index." We can similarly build a "Common-3" index that uses elements useful in at least three of the four countries. Table 2 indicates the elements of the Public, Common-2, and Common-3 indices.
The Common-2 index includes 13 elements. Of these, 10 are within board structure (5 elements), board procedure (2 elements), and disclosure (3 elements) subindices. The ownership structure, shareholder rights, and RPT subindices have only one element each, and only some of these elements are meaningful in each country. 18 The Common-3 index would include 11 elements, 4 within board structure, 2 within board procedure, 3 within disclosure, one each for ownership structure and RPTs, and none for shareholder rights. We did not try to build a Common-4 index -it would have had no elements.
We discuss the predictive value of the Public, Common-2, and Common-3 indices below. But these indices are thin at best. If we found economic or statistical significance for such an index, we could have limited confidence that this significance came from the measured elements, rather than unmeasured elements which were correlated with the measured elements. Similarly, we would have limited confidence that significance came from the main measured subindices (board structure, board procedure, disclosure), rather than from an association between these subindices and other, mostly unmeasured subindices. Country-specific institutions, such as the Brazilian fiscal board, would not be measured at all.
Methodology: Construct Validity and Endogeneity Concerns

Embracing Construct Validity
We adopt here a different approach. We abandon the pretense that a common index can capture what's important about corporate governance in each country. In fact, as we'll see below, the common-2 index doesn't predict much. We posit instead that there is an underlying, unobserved concept of "overall corporate governance"; that overall governance can be usefully divided into unobserved "buckets" of board structure, board procedure, disclosure, ownership structure, minority shareholder rights, and control of RPTs; and that each of these buckets is composed of unobserved "aspects", such as true effectiveness of the board of directors; the audit committee or a local substitute, and so on. We conceive of the goal of measuring corporate governance as developing measurable constructs -at the element, subindex, and overall index levels -that map decently onto unobserved true governance. We are measuring constructs (elements) within larger constructs (subindices) within a larger construct (overall country index). The optimal mapping from constructs to unobservable underlying governance will depend on local rules and institutions. The unobserved aspects or buckets will surely differ across countries; thus, the elements and subindices we construct to capture them must vary as well.
Note too that we are interested in the causal question: How much will a within-country change in governance change Tobin's q, or another outcome variable? The levels against which changes occur will vary greatly across countries, reflecting a mix of local legal rules (say, requirements for board independence or particular disclosures) and common practices. Only governance elements with meaningful variation are useful in answering that causal question. Those elements will also vary substantially across countries.
How will we know whether we have chosen sensible constructs -whether, say, the Brazil disclosure construct is measuring something similar to the India disclosure construct? We can't. A null result could mean either that governance doesn't affect Tobin's q or that we have not measured governance correctly. The most we can hope for is to build similar subindices, roll them up to similar overall indices, look for commonalities, and cautiously interpret what we find. 
Regression Specifications
So onward, to what we do and what we find. Our principal dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin's q (ln(Tobin's q)). Tobin's q is a standard dependent variable in governance-to-value studies. Other things equal, if governance affects firm market value, this should be reflected in Tobin's q.
We take logs to reduce the influence of high-q outlier firms. In our base specification, we also exclude outliers, for which a studentized residual from regressing the dependent variable (here, ln(q) on overall CGI (year-by-year for panel regressions) > |1.96|. Within each country, we then regress ln(q) on our governance index (CGI) and a vector of control variables, denoted X i . We use four different econometric models. The first model is purely cross-sectional, using the first year with governance data for Brazil Many single-country studies, and all of the massively multicountry studies, use this or a similar model to examine the effect of overall corporate governance, or specific aspects such as board structure, on firm market value (e.g., Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Klapper and Love, 2004) . This is a weak specification because one cannot control for omitted firm characteristics that predict both CGI and Tobin's q. The massively multicountry emerging market studies use this specification because they lack time series data on governance.
One goal of this article is to improve on the pure cross-sectional specification by developing time series data, at least in our five countries. We use this time series data in three specifications. The fixed effects model provides unbiased estimates even if the firm effects are correlated with other variables, but imposes a substantial loss of sample size. In Brazil, of the 159 firms in our dataset, only 73 appear at least twice; of 399 Indian firms, only 186 appear at least twice. Moreover, many aspects of governance are sticky. With fixed effects, we can study only aspects with substantial withinfirm time variation. Thus, both RE and FE are useful specifications, with different strengths.
We also run models in which we replace country CGI with each subindex included separately. If we index the subindices by j and denote them SUBj, the RE/FE model becomes:
Model 3-sub (RE and FE)
And similarly for the OLS models 1 and 2. We discuss in Part 5 additional specifications which pool results across countries. 20 In Russia, we use firm-index fixed or random effects.
Comment [by3]:
Some studies, e.g., Dahya et al. (2008) instrument the particular governance aspect they study. Perhaps we can also say a sentence that instruments are at best weak.
Control Variables
Many firm characteristics are potentially associated with both Tobin's q and governance. We therefore include an extensive set of control variables, within the limits of each country's financial reporting, to reduce omitted variable bias (OVB). Table 4 defines our principal control variables, indicates which is used in each country and in regressions which use a common set of control variables, and how each is winsorized (in some specifications). We work hard to limit loss of sample size due to missing data on control variables through a combination of how we define control variables and, in some cases, imputation from an adjacent year.
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Our base specification uses the following control variables. Firm size: we use ln(assets) to control for the effect of firm size on Tobin's q; Firm age: we include ln(years listed +1) to proxy for firm age, because younger firms are likely to be faster-growing and more intangible asset-intensive, which can lead to higher Tobin's q; Leverage: We include book leverage (measured as total liabilities/total assets).
Leverage can influence Tobin's q by providing tax benefits and reducing free cash flow problems; it is also mechanically related to Tobin's q, since both variables use similar denominators. Growth prospects and profitability: Tobin's q is related to a firm's growth prospects and current profitability. We control for growth prospects using geometric sales growth over the last 3 years (or shorter period if 3 years of data are not available). We control for profitability using both net income/assets and EBIT/sales. Capital intensity and tangible versus intangible assets: Asset tangibility can both predict Tobin's q and affect what level and type of governance a firm needs. We control for overall capital intensity using PPE/sales, recent capital spending using capex/PPE, and intangible assets using R&D/sales and advertising/sales. 
Liquidity
Endogeneity
Our use of broad, country-specific governance indices, panel data methods, and extensive control variables strengthen this study, relative to the prior literature. At the same time, except for Korea, we have no exogenous shock to governance. In Korea, large firms (assets > 2 trillion won) face a legal shock to governance which comes into force in 2000-2001, during our study period; we study that shock elsewhere (black, Jang and Kim, 2006; Black and Kim, 2012) . Thus, the different flavors of endogeneity are important concerns.
We can say a bit about how likely our results are to involve causation. Consider first reverse causation, in which firm value predicts governance. To limit reverse causation, we look forward in time by measuring governance in the first part of a year and Tobin's q at year-end. Black and Kim (2012) find limited evidence of reverse causation in Korea. Consider next the optimal differences flavor of endogeneity, with firms choosing their governance to meet firm-specific needs, are more likely to be serious concerns. Black, Jang and Kim (2006b) report that firm characteristics, other than firm size, weakly predict Korean firms' governance choices; and Balasubramanian; Black and Khanna (2010) find a weak association in India between firm characteristics and governance. These results suggest that the optimal differences flavor of endogeneity may be a limited concern. The most important endogeneity 22 We use 9 dummies for Brazil, 11 dummies for India, 4-digit Korean SIC codes for Korea, and 2-digit USequivalent SIC codes for Turkey, and for "common controls" regressions. The expanded working paper provides details on how firms are distributed across industries.
concern is likely to be omitted variables, which are associated with both governance and Tobin's q. Here, control variables and firm fixed effects help, but only so much.
Country-Level Regression Results
Cross-Sectional and Pooled OLS
We begin in Table 5 by examining the association between country governance and Tobin's q, across countries and regression models. Consider first Panel 1, which presents pure cross-sectional OLS results, using only one year for each country. 23 We report the coefficient on country CGI from model 1, and suppress the coefficients on the control variables. In each country, higher CGI predicts higher Tobin's q, by economically meaningful amounts. In Brazil, for example, the 0.213 coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in BCGI predicts an 0.213 (24%) increase in ln(Tobin's q).
Yet the apparent consistency is deceiving. Consider India, where we have governance data for Table 6 highlights the instability of cross-sectional OLS results. In each country, the coefficient on CGI is significant in some years, yet
Subindex level results (presented in our companion paper) provide further reason for concern.
The only significant subindices in a regression that includes each subindex separately are board structure (Brazil and Korea) disclosure (Korea and Turkey), RPTs (Brazil), and shareholder rights (Turkey). We found the opposite (negative) sign on board structure for Brazil in Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2012) , using the same governance data and a very similar specification. 24 For Brazil, the sign on RPT Subindex flips once we move to a pooled sample; for Turkey, the results for Shareholder Rights Subindex survive with random effects, but vanish with fixed effects. The discouraging conclusion: Single-year crosssectional regressions are not a reliable basis for inferring much of anything about corporate governance in emerging markets.
23 Panel A uses the first available year in Brazil, India, and Turkey. In Korea, we use 2001 (just after the large firm reforms come into effect). In Russia, we use 2003, where we have the most complete data.
In Panel 2, we present pooled OLS results. Pooled OLS is still a weak specification because it ignores firm effects; we present it largely for comparison to the even weaker cross-sectional results in Panel A and the firm random and fixed effects results in Panels C and D. The coefficients on country CGI become smaller for all countries except Russia, and become insignificant in India. The t-statistics rise in several countries due to larger sample size.
Firm Random and Fixed Effects
We The Hausman test results suggest that both pooled OLS and RE results are likely to be biased.
But in our experience, RE coefficients are often in between pooled OLS and FE; this is the case in Table   5 for all countries except Brazil (where we lose many firms with fixed effects). If so, and if λ is close to 1, it seems likely that RE will be less biased than pooled OLS. This is an opinion, informed by experience, not a theorem.
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In Panel 4, with fixed effects, the results generally weaken, with drops in coefficients in all countries except India and drops in t-statistics in all countries. They remain significant except in Brazil.
This weakening likely reflects a combination of bias in RE coefficients, loss of sample size, and limited within-firm variation; there is no easy way to assess the relative contribution of each factor.
Robustness to Choice of Control Variables
In Table 7 , we present robustness checks for Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey using different specifications. The specifications are the same as in Table 5 , except as indicated. For each country, we present both Re and FE results. Panel 1 reproduces our base specification from Table 5 . In Panels 2-5 we vary how we handle control variables. In Panel 2, we replace country-specific control variables with a common set of controls -this principally means dropping several variables that we lack in Brazil. The India and Korea results strengthen, suggesting the importance of control variables. In Panel 3, we 25 We are aware of no simulation or other research that assesses the likely relative bias of pooled OLS versus firm random effects in situations where firm fixed effects results may be unreliable. 
Robustness to Choice of Dependent Variable
In Panels 6-9, we vary the specification of Tobin's q as the dependent variable. In Panel 6, instead of excluding outliers, we winsorize ln(q). The results strengthen in Turkey but weaken in other countries. In India, we lose significance for both RE and FE; in Brazil, the RE results are now only marginally significant. In Panel 7, we neither winsorize nor exclude outliers. Results are slightly weaker than in Panel 6. In Panel 8, we use non-logged Tobin's q as the dependent variable, but exclude outliers.
The results weaken dramatically in Turkey -the coefficients more than double, but standard errors more 26 The controls are ln(assets; ln(years listed + 1); 3-year sales growth, PPE/sales, R&D/sales, exports/sales; 2-digit US SIC industry dummies, and cross-listing dummy. Compare the controls in Klapper and Love (2004); Durnev and Kim (2005) ; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) . 27 For example, in Korea, the increase in the coefficient on KCGI using limited controls, relative to the base specifications is +.0031 for FE (6%), but grows to +.0060 for RE (11%); and .0214 for pooled OLS (38%). In Panel 9, we switch to ln(marker/book) as dependent variable, and exclude outliers.
[*discussion of results to come]
Pooled Regressions across Countries
Pooled Index Results
We assess in Table 8 what results we would get if we treated our distinct country indices as if they capture the same underlying construct, combine CGI scores across countries into a "Pooled CGI" index, and use this index to predict Tobin's q for a sample which includes all four countries. We use the same four specifications as in In column (1), Pooled CGI is strongly significant, with similar coefficients, across our four models. This suggests that our country indices are capturing something about governance that affects firm market value. This, in turn, might justify combining scores from country-CGI indices that are broadly similar at the subindex level, but quite different at the element level.
With regard to the choice among models, a Breusch-Pagan test continues to strongly reject the absence of firm effects. Median λ is 0.72, suggesting that RE may be an acceptable specification, albeit unweighted.
Common-2 and Non-Common CGI Indices
We next build the Common-2 Index, and assess what it predicts. Recall from Section 2.5 that this index uses the 13 elements with data available in all four countries, which were useful in at least two
Comment [BSB9]:
Need to add r/e market/book and market/sales, once we have results for all countries; currently have these only for Korea countries. Within each country, we build the index following the same rules as for overall country CGI:
Each subindex is an equally weighted average of the elements of the subindex. If a subindex has only one element, the element and subindex are identical. If a subindex has no elements in a particular country, we drop it.
28 Common-2 Index is then the renormalized sum of normalized subindices.
We then return to the country indices, remove elements that are in the Common-2 Index, and use the remaining elements to build subindices, an overall index, following the same procedure as for the country CGIs, and a cross-country index, following the same procedure as for the Pooled Index. We term the multicountry index "Non-Common CGI." Table 7 , column (2) provides results for the Common-2 Index. It is positive and significant for the simple cross-country OLS regressions (to which, as discussed above, we assign little value). But the Common-2 Index drops sharply in magnitude and becomes insignificant with pooled OLS; drops further but is marginally significant with random effects, and becomes trivially small and insignificant with fixed effects (coeff. = 0.007; t = 0.38). Results for the narrower Common-3 are similar. Thus, there is at best weak evidence that the best common index we can build predicts firm market value.
In column (3) we assess the predictive value of the non-common index elements. Non-common CGI is statistically and economically strong across specifications; indeed it takes a larger coefficient and t-statistic than Pooled CGI. The combined results from columns (2) and (3) support our judgment that country-specific aspects of governance are crucial in capturing whether and how corporate governance matters in emerging markets.
We explore the relative power of the Common-2 Index and Non-common CGI in columns (4A) and (4B), by including both in the same regression, otherwise similar to earlier columns. The NonCommon Index remains strong across specifications, especially the more robust RE and FE models. In contrast, the Common-2 Index weakens further. It becomes only marginally significant in cross-sectional OLS, and has an essentially zero coefficient in all pooled models. In effect, once we include the Noncommon aspects of governance, the Common-2 Index has no additional predictive power. In effect, it's power when included alone in column (2) is spurious and reflects OVB, where the omitted variable is the rest of country governance, proxied by Non-common CGI. The correlation between Common-2 Index and Non-common Index is 0.36, sufficient to induce significant OVB.
This reinforces a point made in the Introduction. Omitted variable bias that arises from using narrow governance measures can be severe. This concern was an important part of our motive for building broad governance indices and insisting that they be country specific, to better capture what about governance is likely to matters in each country. Our concern was not misplaced.
We reach a similar conclusion about the predictive power of the Common-2 Index in columns (5A) and (5B). Here we include Common-2 Index and Pooled CGI (including both common and noncommon elements) together. Pooled CGI remains strong, with coefficients similar to column 1, where it was included alone. The coefficient on Common-2 provides an estimate of the predictive power of the part of Common-2 Index that is orthogonal to Pooled CGI, conditioned on controls. The coefficients in the pooled models are negative, and the RE coefficient is marginally significant. Taken together, the results in columns (4) and (5) provide strong evidence that what matters most about corporate governance is better captured by the non-common, country-specific elements; not the common ones.
We also examine the power of Common-2 Index in each country, and present results in the last row of Table 7 . This index is significant in Korea with random effects, but insignificant with fixed effects. Coefficients in Brazil, India, and Turkey are small and insignificant coefficient with both RE and FE. In pooled OLS results (not reported), Common-2 Index is again significant only in Korea. This is a further caution sign for a common index: Such results as one finds could be driven by a small number of countries.
Revisiting Prior Studies
With the weak results for the Common-2 Index in mind, we revisit three well-known, massively multicountry studies, which use the common index approach: Klapper and Love (2004) ; Durnev and Kim (2005); and Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) . These studies are often seen as providing evidence that firm-level governance predicts higher firm value. For us, this overstates the reliance one should place on these purely cross-sectional studies. Our goal is to assess the robustness of results, not to criticize these articles. All were pioneering efforts when written. Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) are concerned as much with what predicts governance as with whether governance predicts firm market value. Durnev and Kim and Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell also study the impact of country characteristics; to do so, they need to use country random rather than fixed effects. Moreover, early efforts can take approaches that would be questioned later on; and many papers written a decade use methods that would be seen as suboptimal today. Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) study the association between board independence and market value, proxied by raw Tobin's q, for firms with a controlling shareholder. For some countries, they guess which directors are independent; we discuss above why this is problematic. Their control variables are limited (ln(sales), sales growth, intangible/total assets, share price variance, 1-digit industries, whether a firm participates in two or more 2-digit industries); they use country random effects.
Their p-values range from .01 to .05 depending on specification. They mix developed and emerging markets, roughly equally; their results could be coming from either group or both; one cannot tell.
We conclude that our weak results for the Common-2 Index are not inconsistent with these studies. They have somewhat stronger t-and p-values, but much weaker specifications. As we show above, those specifications can strongly affect results.
Conclusion
The methodology goal of this article was to highlight, and then make progress in addressing, the methods challenges involved in cross-country assessments of what matters in corporate governance. The core challenges in emerging markets are lack of data and construct validity. We address these by relying heavily on hand-collected data and by building country-specific indices. Important data challenges remain. For example, we build a Disclosure Index in each country, but the number of elements varies from three in Korea to 21 in Turkey. We are unable to build a meaningful RPT Subindex in Korea or in Turkey.
Endogeneity, principally omitted variable bias, is a major concern; we address it by a broad governance index, panel data with firm fixed or random effects and a rich set of control variables.
Sensitivity to specification is important and often underexamined; we respond by varying our regression models, control variables, and how we define the dependent variable.
Our substantive goal was to assess, in a cross-country framework, whether firm-level variation in corporate governance predicts firm-level variation in market value. For that goal, the best common index 30 See Khanna, Kogan and Palepu (2006) for further discussion of the CLSA index.
we can build turns out to have negligible predictive power. In contrast, country-specific indices that are tailored to country rules and institutions have substantial predictive power. More tentatively, it may be possible to pool indices, which seek to measure similar underlying constructs in different, countryspecific ways, to develop meaningful cross-country governance measures. Black, Bernard, Hasung Jang and Woochan Kim (2006a) , Does Corporate Governance Affect Firms' Market Definitions of principal non-governance variables, winsorization level for regressions in which we winsorized control variables; and indication of which controls are available in each of Brazil (B), India (I), Korea (K), Russia (R), and Turkey (T). We drop firm-years with zero or negative sales. Last column indicated which control variables are available in Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey; we use these variables in "common controls" regressions below. We replace missing values with zero for R&D/sales, advertising/sales, and exports/sales. Income statement amounts are measured for each year t; balance sheet amounts at the end of each year t. Table 5 ; dependent variable, means of addressing outliers, and control variables (coefficients suppressed) are same as Table 5 except as indicated. Table 4 discusses how we winsorize controls. Limited control variables in Panel 4 are ln(assets; ln(years listed + 1); 3-year sales growth, PPE/sales, R&D/sales, exports/sales; 2-digit US SIC industry dummies, and cross-listing dummy. t-statistics (using firm clusters) in parentheses. R 2 is overall for random effects; within for fixed effects., *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) in boldface. ) for Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey. Common-2 index is defined in text. Country-level Non-common CGI indices are constructed in same manner as country-CGI, using elements that are not part of Common-2 Index, then combined into a multicountry Non-common CGI Index. All regressions use winsorized common control variables (shown in 
